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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
000O000

RONALD CURTIS,
Petitioner/Appellant,
Case No. 930360

vs.
UTAH. BOARD OF PARDONS,
et al.,
Respondents/Appellees,
000O000

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

1. Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to
78-2a-3 (g), Utah Code Annotated.
2. Constitutional provisions pertinent to this appeal are
the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and
Article I section 7 and 11 of the Utah Constitution.
3. The issues presented on this appeal are;
a. Were sufficient facts and allegations pleaded in the
petition to warrant review by the lower court.
b. Does an inmate have due process rights in parole board
hearings, and
c. Did the trial court abuse itfs discretion in dismissing
the petition without a hearing on the merits.

1.

FACTS
The petitioner, Ronald Curtis was found guilty of sexual abuse and
sentenced to a term of one to fifteen years at the Utah State
Prison. He appeared before the Utah Board of Pardons on 3 March
1989* During his initial parole grant hearing the Utah Board of
Pardons sentenced the petitioner to serve all of the one to fifteen
year term. The Board refused to provide documents with they made
this determination, they refused to allow the petitioner to
speak on his own behalf or to allow anyone to speak for him* The
Board refused to allow the petitioner to present any mitigating
evidence in his own behalf, or to call any witnesses.
On 5 April 1993, the petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus
relief in the Third Judicial District Court. The petition made
factual allegations of the denial of due process, by the Utah
Board of Pardons, during the petitioners parole grant hearing.
These allegations, if proven, were sufficient to warrant both
habeas corpus review, and habeas corpus relief.
On 4 May 1993, Judge David S. Young dismissed the petition on itfs
face without hearing. See attached order dismissing petition.
This appeal follows that dismissal.

ARGUMENT
Judge David S. Young abused his discretion by dismissing the
petitioners complaint without hearing. Judge Young stated in pairt
that requiring the petitioner to serve all fifteen years was
within the Boards discretion.
2.

However, Judge Young failed to address the many allegations
wherein the petitioner alleged that he was denied the right to
speak, defend, present evidence or witnesses* Judge Young failed
to take notice of the many facts that gave rise to the petition
or the cause of action therein*
Does an inmate have a right to speak on his own behalf at
a parole grant hearing? The Board's own policy dictates that he
does indeed have that right. See attached Board policy, R671-301.
Does an inmate have a right to see documents used against
him at a parole grant hearing ? Again, the Board1s policy requires
that access. See attached policy, R671-303.
By refusing to allow the petitioner to see documents used
against him, and refusing to allow him to speak on his own behalf,
the Board violated the petitioners right to due process.
Our Supreme Court visited the issue of due process ±% Utah
Board of Pardons hearings in the Foote case* Chief Justice Hall
wrote in Foote, "the mandate of the due process clause of article
I, section 7 of the Declaration of Rights in the Utah Const,
is comprehensive in its application to all activities of state
government. It is the province of the judiciary to assure that a
claim of the denial of due process by an arm of government be heard
and, if justified, that it be vindicated."

.

.

. "assuredly,

the parole board is not outside the constitutional mandate that
the actions of government must afford due process."

Foote v.

Utah Board of Pardons, 808 P.2d 734. Judge Hall also stated,

3-

"there is no question that due process protection apply at the
time of sentencing by a trial judge . . . H , and "the Utah Const,
certainly requires that equivalent due process protection be
afforded when the Board of Pardons determines the actual number
of years a defendant is to serve.11 Id.

at 734-35.

The petition articulated sufficient facts which required at
least a cursory look by the court. Judge Young further compounded
the petitioners right violations by refusing to look into his
complaint by way of an evidentiary hearing.
The United States District Court for Utah has also ruled on
the issue of what rights an inmate is entitled to during a board
hearing. Judge Thomas Greene set out an even more extensive list
of rights that an inmate is entitled too, during a board Rearing.
See attached copy of Judge Greene's order in Hewitt v. Haun,
92-C-264G.
The petitioner was denied basic due process rights by the
Utah Board of Pardons. He articulated sufficient facts to warrant
habeas corpus review. Judge Young failed to give the petitioner
access to review, by dismissing the petition on its face. The
petitioner is entitled to review by the District Court. There
are sufficient facts alleged in the petition to satisfy the mandate
set by Chief Justice Hall in Foote. Judge Young abused his discretion and authority by dismissing the petition without a hearing
on the merits.

4.

CONCLUSION
This Court should reverse the decision of the lower Court
and order the matter remanded for hearing* The petition filed by
the petitioner/appellant articulated sufficient facts to warrant
a review by the Court, and if proven, to warrant habeas corpus
relief* The Utah Board of Pardons denied the petitioner all of
his basic fundamental rightLs under the Utah Constitution and the
Constitution of the United States*
DATED this \X*

day of August, 1993.

Ronald J# Curtis

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of
the foregoing to Jan Graham, Utah Atty General 236 State Capitol,
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114* postage prepaid and mailed at Draper,
Utah on the

\JU_ day of August, 1993.

Ronald J. Curtia

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MINUTE ENTRY
CURTIS, RONALD
PLAINTIFF
VS
UTAH STATE BOARD OF PARDONS
DEFENDANT

CASE NUMBER 930901978 HC
DATE 05/04/93
HONORABLE DAVID S YOUNG
COURT REPORTER
COURT CLERK NP

TYPE OF HEARING:
PRESENT:
P. ATTY. CURTIS, RONALD, PRO SE
D. ATTY.

THE PETITIONER HAS FILED A PETITION FOR EXTRAORDINARY
RELIEF CLAIMING THAT HIS RIGHTS HAVE BEFN VIOLATED BY THE BOARD
OF PARDONS WHEN THEY STATE.D AT HIS INITIAL HEARING THAT HE WOULD
BE REQUIRED TO SERVE HIS ENTIRE! TERM WITHOUT PAROLE. THE BASIS
OF THAT DECISION IS A MATTER WITHIN THE SOUND DISCRETION OF THE
BOARD OF PARDONS AND MAY NOT BE CHALLENGED WITHOUT AN ALLEGATION
AS TO WHY THAT DECISIONS MAY BE "ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS" OR
"CRUEL AND UNUSUAL" IN SOME LEGAL "WAT: =^HE=DEC1SI0N' TO"T*EQUIRE
THE PETITIONER TO SERVE ANY LAWFUL TIME WITHIN THE LIMITS OF THE
JUDGMENT AND COMMITMENT IS AN APPROPRIATE OPTION OF THE BOARD
AND IS FURTHER A MATTER FOR THEIR DISCRETION. THE PETITIONER
ALLEGES NO FACTUAL BASIS WHICH WOULD GIVE RISE TO THE COURT'S
CONSIDERATION OF THE PETITION ON IT'S MERITS.
THE PETITION IS THUS DENIED AND DISMISSED. THIS MINUTE
ENTRY SIGNED BY THE COURT SHALL CONSTITUTE THE FINAL ORDER OF
THE COURT.
C.C. TO MR. CURTIS, PRO SE

R671-303-1

Pardons (Board of)

ing, or are causing a disturbance or interfering with the
holding of a fair and impartial hearing, restrictions
may be imposed to eliminate those problems.
PRIOR APPROVAL. News media representatives
wishing to use photographic, recording or transmitting
equipment or to be considered for one of the five
reserved media seats shall submit a request in writing
to the Board Administrator. Such requests must be submitted at least AS hours in advance of a regularly
scheduled Board of Pardons hearing and at least one
week in advance of a Commutation Hearing. If requesting the use of equipment, the request must specify by
type, brand and model all the pieces of equipment to be
used.
APPROVING EQUIPMENT. If the request is to use
photographic, recording or transmitting equipment, at
least 24 hours prior to a regularly scheduled hearing
and 96 hours prior to a Commutation Hearing, it shall
be the responsibility of a representative of the news
agency making the request to confer with the Board
Administrator to work out the details. If the Board
Administrator is unfamiliar with the equipment proposed to be used, he may require that a demonstration
be performed to determine if it is likely to be intrusive,
cause a disturbance or will inhibit the holding of a fair
and YmpartisA nearing in any way. M in* Board Administrator or the Board determines that such may occur,
it may be required that the equipment be modified or
substituted for equipment that will not cause a problem
or the equipment may be banned.
'Video tape or "on air" type cameras mounted on a tripod and still cameras encased in a soundproof box and
mounted on a tripod shall be deemed to be approved
equipment
If the equipment is approved for use at a hearing, its
location and mode of operation shall be approved in
advance by the Board Administrator and it shall
remain in a stationary position during the entire hearing and shall be operated as unobtrusively as possible.
There shall be no artificial light used.
If there is more than one request for the same type of
equipment, the news agencies shall be required to
make pool arrangements, as no more than one piece of
the same type of equipment shall be allowed. If no
agreement can be reached on who the pool representative will be, the Board Administrator shall draw a name
at random. All those wishing to be a pool representative
must agree in advance to fully cooperate v». v all pool
arrangements.
BESEHVED MEDIA SEATING. U tnere are ieweT
than four other requests received prior to the deadline,
the request shall be approved. If more than five
requests are made, the Board Administrator shall allocate the seating based on a pool arrangement. Each category shall select its own representatives). If no
agreement can be reached on who the representative(s)
will be, the Board Administrator shall draw names at
random. All those wishing to be a pool representative
must agree in advance to fully cooperate with all pool
arrangements.
One seat shall be allocated to each of the following
categories:
1. Local daily newspapers with statewide circulation
2. Major wire services with local bureaus
3. Local television stations with regularly scheduled

120

daily newscasts
4. Local radio stations with regularly scheduled daily
newscasts
5. Daily, weekly or monthly publications (in that
order) located in the area where the criminal activity
took place.
6. If the requests submitted do not fill all of the above
categories, a seat shall be allocated to a representative
of a major wire service with no local bureau or a
national publication (in that order).
If seats remain unfilled, one additional seat shall be
allocated to the categories in the above order until all
seats are filled. No news agency shall have more than
one individual assigned to reserved media seating
unless all other requests have been satisfied.
VIOLATIONS. Any news agency found to be in violation of this policy may have its representatives
restricted in or banned from covering future Board
hearings.
1SS7

R671-303. Offender
Information.

77-27.5

Access

to

R671-303-1. Policy.
R671-303-2. Procedure.
R071-3O3-1. Policy.
An offender shall have access to all information relating to his case on which parole decisions are made
except that which is classified confidential.
R671-303-2. Procedure.
All material submitted to the Board, except that
which is specifically classified as confidential, shall be
available to be reviewed with the offender.
The Board may review the offender's record and cover
areas of concern during the hearing. The offender may
comment, clarify issues and ask questions at the hearing.
Upon written request from the offender, copies of
requested information not classified as confidential
shall be provided at the offender's expense.
KEY: Inmat—' right*
1SS7

63-2 M S
63.2.86.4

11611-304. Board Bearing Record.
R671-304-1. Policy.
R671-304-2. Procedure.
R671-304-1. Policy.
The Board shall cause a record to be made of all proceedings.
R671-304-2. Procedure.
A record (verbatim transcript, tape recording or written summary) shall be made of all hearings. The record
shall be retained by the Board for future reference or
transcription upon request at cost. However, copies
may be provided at no cost to the petitioner in accordance with UCA 77-27-8 (3). The record shall be

119

Administration

minimal. Under these circumstances, the offender shall
be reinstated on parole with appropriate conditions.
For time spent in mental health facilities, the
offender shall receive credit toward expiration of sentence and the total period of incarceration.
KEY: criminal e o a p t u n c y *
IMS

77.27-2
77-27-7
77-27-12

R671-301. Personal Appearance.

3. An individual Board member may travel to the
jurisdiction and conduct the hearing, record the proceeding, and make a written record and recommendation for the Board's final decision.
4. Send a Board hearing officer to conduct the hearing, record the proceeding and make a written record
and recommendation for the Board's final decision.
5. A hearing may be conducted by way of conference
telephone call with the consent of the offender.
I0EY: govtnuMnt hMrings
1*87

R671-30M. Policy.
R671-301-2. Procedure.
R671-30M. Policy.
It is the policy of the Board of Pardons that all offenders shall have a personal appearance before the Board,
unless waived prior to a final decision to release.
R671-301-2. Procedure.
By statute, the Board or its designee is required to see
each and every offender in at least one hearing. This
usually occurs at the offender's initial hearing. However, by policy, the Board requires personal appearances for rehearings in cases when a date was not
established, for rescission hearings, and for parole revocation hearings. In rehearings, the offender is afforded
all the rights and considerations afforded in the initial
hearing except as provided by other Board policies
because the setting of a parole date is still at issue. In
rescission hearings and parole revocation hearings, a
personal appearance is mandatory unless waived. The
offender is also given adequate notice of such hearings
so that he may prepare. The hearing is conducted in
such a manner to minimize distractions and facilitate
offender input.
An offender has the right to be present at a parole
grant, rehearing, rescission, or parole violation hearing
if he is within the state (UCA 77-27-7). The offender has
the right to be present at hearings conducted by a
Board hearing officer. He may speak on his own behalf,
present documents, ask, and answer questions. An
offender who waives his right, or refuses to personally
attend the hearing shall be advised that a decision may
be made in his absence.
If an offender is being housed out of state he may
waive the right to a personal appearance. The waiver
shall be in writing and witnessed by a staff member at
the institution where the offender is housed. A written
waiver shall be voluntary. The original copy of the
waiver is to be forwarded to the Board and retained in
the offender's file.
If the offender refuses to waive the appearance, any of
the following four alternatives shall be utilized at the
discretion of the Board in conducting the hearing:
1. Request the Warden to return the offender to the
state for the hearing.
2. A courtesy hearing may be conducted with the consent of the offender by the paroling authority or jurisdiction where he is housed. A request along with a
complete copy of Utah's record shall be forwarded for
the hearing. All reports, a summary of the hearing, and
a recommendation shall be returned to the Utah Board
for final action.

R671-302-2

77-27-2
77-27-7
77-27-t
77-27-11
77-27-21

R671-302. N e w s M e d i a a n d P u b l i c
Access to Hearings.
R671-302-1. Policy.
R671-302-2. Procedure.
B671-302-1. Policy.
According to state law and subject to fairness and
security requirements, Board of Pardons hearings shall
be open to the public, including representatives of the
news media.
B671-302-2. Procedure.
LIMITED SEATING. When the number of people
wishing to attend a hearing exceeds the seating capacity of the room where the hearing will be conducted, priority shall be given to:
1. Individuals involved in the hearing
2. Up to five people selected by the offender
3. Up to five members of the news media as allocated
by the Board Administrator (see RESERVED MEDIA
SEATING)
4. Members of the public and media4 on a first-come,
first served basis.
SECURITY AND CONDUCT. All attendees are subject to Prison security requirements and must conduct
themselves in a manner which does not interfere with
the orderly conduct of the hearing. Any individual causing a disturbance or engaging in behavior deemed by
the Board to be disruptive of the proceeding may be
ordered to leave and security personnel of the prison
may he requested to escort the individual from the premises.
EXECUTIVE SESSION. No filming, recording or
transmitting of executive session portions of any hearing shall be allowed.
NEWS MEDIA EQUIPMENT. Subject to prior
approval by the Board Administrator or the Board (see
APPROVING EQUIPMENT), the news agency representatives shall be permitted to operate photographic,
recording or transmitting equipment during the public
portions of any hearing. When more than one news
agency requests permission to use photographic,
recording or transmitting equipment, a pooling
arrangement may be required.
When it is determined by the Board Administrator or
the Board that any such equipment or operators of that
equipment have the potential to cause a disturbance or
interfere with the holding of a fair and impartial hear-

RONALD CURTIS
Attorney Pro Se
Utah State Prison
P.O. Box 250
Draper, Utah 84020

IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
RONALD CURTIS,
Petitioner,
vs.

*
*
*
*

PETITION FOR EXTRAORDINARY
RELIEF

*

Utah State Board of Pardons, *
SCOTT CARVER, Warden,
*
Respondent.
*

Case No.
Judge

COMES NOW the Petitioner, Ronald Curtis, pursuant to the
following Rule of Civil Procedure:

X

Rule
Rule
Rule
Rule

65B(b)
65B(b)
65B(b)
65B(c)

since
since
since
since

claim
claim
claim
claim

is
is
is
is

based
based
based
based

on
on
on
on

original commitment, or
parole violation, or
probation violation, or
parole grant hearing,

and for cause of action alleges as follows:
1.

Petitioner is being illegally restrained at the following

location: Utah State Prison, P.O. Box 250, Draper, Utah 84020.
2.

Petitioner was convicted and sentenced at the following

Court: Petitioner is challenging a Board of Pardons hearing.
The dates of the proceedings in which the conviction (or Board of
Pardons decision) was entered are as follows: ^Petitioner's parole
grant hearing was on March 3, 1989.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS AND POST CONVICTION RELIEF
The case number for these proceedings is:
and is case number
3.

N/A

not known;

known

.

In plain and concise terms, all of the facts on the basis

of which the Petitioner claims a substantial violation of rights as
the result of the commitment (or terms of parole) are as follows:
a.

Petitioner attended an original parole grant hearing

on March 3, 1989. Wherein, petitioner's constitutional due process
rights were violated.
b.

Petitioner

alleges

that

the

respondents

set

a

rehearing date for the petitioner above the sentencing guidelines
without justification or reason.
c.

Petitioner did not receive a rehearing date and was

sentenced to serve the entire 15 years without a parole date.
d.

Respondents refused and denied the petitioner the

opportunity to present mitigating facts regarding his case during
his appearance before the board of pardons and refused to allow the
petitioner to present witnesses, documents psychiatric reports,
etc.
e.

Respondents refused and denied the petitioner the

right to speak during his" appearance before them on March 3, 1989.
f.

Respondents refused and denied the petitioner the

right to review documents upon which the respondents based their
2

PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS AND POST CONVICTION RELIEF
decision.
g.

Respondents also refused and denied the petitioner

the right to present evidence or testimony on his own behalf.

In

fact, they refused to allow petitioner to speak at all.
4.

The

judgment

of

conviction

or

the

commitment

for

violation of probation or parole has been reviewed on appeal.
Yes

O^No

The number and caption or title of the appellate
proceeding and the results of the review are as follows:

It was not appealed because

?^6-A</0>P

(^IUILTI/

_X_Question not applicable since this claim concerns a parole grant
hearing for which there is no appeal or administrative remddy.
5.

The legality of the commitment for violation of probation

or parole or the legality of the parole grant hearing has been
reviewed on appeal.

Yes

X

No

If so, the reasons for the

denial of relief in the prior proceeding are as follows:
N/A
6.

Petitioner requests that he be appointed legal counsel

based on the attached motion and affidavit of impecuniosity.
7.

The

following

documents

are

attached

hereto

incorporated herein by reference (check all that apply):
3

and

PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS AND POST CONVICTION RELIEF
_X
X

Affidavits that support Petitioner's allegations
Copies of records that support Petitioner's allegations,
Other evidence that supports Petitioner's allegations
Copies of pleadings, orders and memoranda of the Court in
any other post-conviction or civil proceeding that
adjudicated the legality of Petitioner's commitment

8,

Petitioner was unable to obtain and attach the following

documents

because

(list the efforts you made

to obtain

the

documents and the results of your efforts):

9.

That

pursuant

to URCP

Rules

65B(b)(12)

and

54(d),

Petitioner requests that this Court order the Respondent to obtain
such transcripts of proceedings or court records which are relevant
and material to this case and requests that the county in which he
was originally charged be directed to pay the costs of the
proceeding.
10.

(See attached motion and affidavit of impecuniosity).

The statute of limitations does not apply in this matter

because the petitioner was convicted prior to the enactment of the
law,

and

due

to

the

continuing

nature

of

the

petitioner's

incarceration UCA §78-12-31.5 does not bar this action.
WHEREFORE, Petitioner prays that this Court:
1.

Schedule an evidentiary hearing at which time Petitioner

may be present and represented by counsel.
2.

Permit Petitioner, who remains indigent, to proceed
4

PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS AND POST CONVICTION RELIEF
without prepayment of costs< fees or other assessments.
3.

Grant Petitioner the authority to obtain subpoenas in

Forma Pauperis, for witnesses and documents necessary to assist in
the proof of the facts alleged in the petition as stated above.
4.

Issue an Order for Post Conviction Relief to have the

Petitioner brought before it, to the end that he may be discharged
from the illegal and unconstitutional confinement and restraint.
Dated this

^

day of 1 Aftfl\J>

RONALD CURTIS
Attorney Pro Se

5
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTL^
DISTRICT OF UTAH - CENTRAL DIVISION

<5 *•,

"V

^ /

DAVID LEE HEWITT,
Plaintiff,

ORDER

vs.
PETE HAUN, et al.f

Civil No.

92-C-264G

Respondent.

Plaintiff, David Lee Hewitt ("Hewitt"), an inmate
confined at the Utah State Prison (USP), filed suit under 42
U.S.C. § 1983.

He is suing members of the Board of Pardon in

their official and individual capacities.

Hewitt claims that the

Board members violated his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights
to due process, his Sixth Amendment right to counsel, and his
Eighth Amendment protection against cruel and unusual punishment«
The case was referred to the Magistrate Judge under 28
U.S.C- § 636(b)(1)(B), who concluded that Hewitts claims were
without merit and recommended that his complaint be dismissed
under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d).

Hewitt timely filed Objections to the

Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation.
The Court finds that oral argument would not be of
material assistance in determining the issues in this case.
Accordingly, Hewitt's Objections to the Magistrate Judge's Report
and Recommendation will be reviewed de novo and decided on the
existing record.

FACTS
On or about November 1, 1991, after having been
sentenced to the Utah State Prison for an indeterminate term by a
Utah state court judge, Hewitt appeared before the Utah Board of
Pardons for his initial parole release hearing.

According to

Hewitt's complaint, he was not allowed to present witnesses,
cross-examine witnesses or view any of the reports used by the
Board in making its sentencing determination.

Further, Hewitt

claims that he was not allowed to have an attorney present.
Finally, he contends his sentence was based on several unrelated
arrests and exceeded Utah Sentencing Guidelines.
ISSUES FOR DETERMINATION
Since this matter is before the Court on a
recommendation of dismissal, we assume without deciding that
Hewitt's factual allegations are correct.
F.2d 1287, 1289 (10th Cir. 1984).

Dock v. Latimer* 729

The issues involved in this

motion are (1) whether the alleged actions of the members of the
Board of Pardon could potentially constitute violations of
Hewitt's rights under the United States Constitution1 and (2)

"The first inquiry in any S 1983 suit is whether the plaintiff has been
deprived of a right *secured by the Constitution and laws' of the United States."
Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 140 (1979).
2

whether the members of the Board could potentially be held liable
for such violations.2
ANALYSIS
I.

CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
Hewitt alleges that three constitutional rights

violations occurred at his initial parole release hearing before
the Utah Board of Pardons.

First, that his rights to due process

of law under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments were violated
when he was not allowed to present witnesses, cross-examine
witnesses, or view reports.

Second, that his Sixth and

Fourteenth Amendment rights to counsel were violated when the
Board did not allow him to have an attorney present at his parole
hearing.

Third, that he was subjected to cruel and unusual

punishment contrary to the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments
because the Board used improper factors to exceed its own
sentencing guidelines.

The Magistrate Judge found that Hewitt's

complaint was without merit and that the parole officers are
entitled to absolute immunity.

The issues will be discussed

seriatim.
A.

Due Process Rights Under the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments

If a plaintiff has been deprived of a constitutional right, it must then
be determined whether the state parole officials have immunity as a matter of
federal law. See Dock, 729 F.2d at 1291.

3

H e w i t t s first claim is that his Fifth and Fourteenth
due process rights were violated by the manner in which his
initial parole release hearing was conducted.

The court finds

that Hewitt's allegations could potentially form a cause of
action*
1.

Due Process Rights at a Parole Release Hearing

The Federal Constitution itself does not grant a
prisoner due process rights at a parole release hearing.
Greenholtz v. Nebraska Penal Inmates, 442 U.S. 1, 7 (1979).
However, state laws can create liberty interests which are then
protected by the United States Constitution.

A state cannot

deprive a person of those interests without due process of law.3
No protectible liberty interest is created by the Utah1
Parole Statutes as such.4

However a liberty interest at the

initial parole release hearing does exist under Utah / s
indeterminate sentencing scheme.

Under that law, the Board of

Pardons determines a defendants sentence at the initial parole
release hearing.

The Supreme Court of Utah has held that due

*
See Walker v. Hughes, 558 F.2d 1247, 1255 (6th Cir. 1977); Wolff v.
McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 558 (1974); and Pope v. United States Parole Commission,
647 F.2d 125, 126 (10th Cir. 1981).
A liberty interest in parole is recognized when a state's statutes
create an expectation of parole. The mere existence of a parole system does not
create such an interest. Greenholtz v. Nebraska Penal Inmates. 442 U.S. 1, 12
(1979). Utah Parole Statutes do not create an expectation of parole, thus there
is no liberty interest under those statutes. Houtz v. DeLand, 718 F.Supp. 1497,
1502 (D. Utah, 1989).

4

process p r o t e c t i o n s must be provided a t t h a t h e a r i n g . 5

In Foote

v. Utah Board of Pardons, t h e c o u r t s t a t e d :
[ t ] h e r e i s no q u e s t i o n t h a t due p r o c e s s
p r o t e c t i o n s apply a t t h e time of s e n t e n c i n g
by t h e t r i a l judge, whether t h e judge
determines t h e a c t u a l number of y e a r s t o be
served, as in t h e f e d e r a l c o u r t s and some
s t a t e c o u r t s , or only whether t o send t h e
defendant t o p r i s o n , a s i s t h e case i n Utah.
The Utah C o n s t i t u t i o n c e r t a i n l y r e q u i r e s t h a t
e q u i v a l e n t due p r o c e s s p r o t e c t i o n be afforded
when t h e board of pardons determines t h e
a c t u a l number of y e a r s a defendant i s t o
serve.
Foote, 808 P.2d 734, 735 (Utah 1991) (emphasis added).
The reasoning in Foote i s compelling.

As t h e Supreme

Court has s t a t e d , "the s e n t e n c i n g p r o c e s s , as well as t h e t r i a l
i t s e l f , must s a t i s f y t h e requirements of t h e Due Process C l a u s e . "
United S t a t e s v. Sunrhodes, 831 F.2d 1537, 1541 (10th Cir 1987). 6
This Court holds t h a t due p r o c e s s p r o t e c t i o n s a r e r e q u i r e d a t t h e
i n i t i a l parole release hearing.
2.

P l a i n t i f f ' s Asserted Due Process V i o l a t i o n s

"[D]ue process i s f l e x i b l e and c a l l s for such
procedural p r o t e c t i o n s as t h e p a r t i c u l a r s i t u a t i o n demands.

S t a t e court i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of i t s laws are not binding upon a f e d e r a l
court in determining f e d e r a l c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i s s u e s .
S h i r l e y v . Chestnut, 603
F.2d 805, 807 (10th Cir. 1979); Martin v . D u f f i e , 463 F.2d 464, 468 (10th C i r .
1 9 7 2 ) . N o n e t h e l e s s , a f e d e r a l court may c o n s i d e r s t a t e court d e c i s i o n s t o a s s i s t
i t i n determining what r i g h t s s t a t e laws c r e a t e . J d . a t 468.
6

See a l s o Mempa v . Rhav, 3 8 9 . U . S . 128, 134-137 (1967) ( n o n - c a p i t a l
punishment c a s e ) ; Accord Gardner v . F l o r i d a , 430 U.S. 349, 1204 (1977) ( c a p i t a l
punishment c a s e ) ;
Burlington v . M i s s o u r i , 451 U.S. 430, 446 (1981) ( c a p i t a l
punishment c a s e ) .
5

. . ."

Morissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972).

Merely

because due process applies does not automatically mean a
defendant is entitled to the full spectrum of rights which are
recognized in the process of conviction-

Greenholtz v. Nebraska

Penal Inmates, 442 U.S. 1, 13 (1979).
Defendant Hewitt alleges that his rights to due process
of law under the Fifth and Fourteenth amendments were violated at
his initial parole release hearing when:

(1) he was not allowed

to call witnesses at the hearing to testify in his behalf; (2) he
was not allowed to cross examine witnesses who testified against
him; and (3) he was not allowed to view reports submitted to the
Board, including a presentence report.
Regarding the first alleged violation, a limited due
process right to present witnesses exists.

Such a right has been

recognized in other cases where the situations involved seemed
less crucial to a defendants rights than the present case.
Regarding the second alleged violation, the Magistrate
Judge ruled that a defendant does not have an absolute right to
confront and cross-examine witnesses at a sentencing hearing.8
We agree.

Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974) (an inmate has the right to
call witnesses in his behalf at a disciplinary prison proceeding, so long as it
will not jeopardize institutional safety).
8

United States v. Sunrhodes, 831 F.2d 1537, 1543 (10th Cir. 1987)
(referring to Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949) and Williams v. Oklahoma,
358 U.S. 576 (1959)); United States v. Beaulieu, 893 F.2d 1177, 1180 (10th Cir.
1990) (citing Sunrhodes).

6

Regarding the third alleged v i o l a t i o n , a due process
right of reasonable access to documents used in making a
sentencing determination e x i s t s ,

"Due process requires that a

defendant not be sentenced on the basis of *misinformation of a
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l magnitude,'••

United States v. Beaulieu, 893 F.2d

1177, 1181 (10th. Cir. 1990), c i t i n g United States v. Tucker. 404
U.S. 443, 447 (1972) . 9

I t appears to the Court that the

opportunity to review and correct erroneous information i s
e s s e n t i a l to the protection of t h i s right. 1 0
B.

Right to Legal Counsel Under the Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments
Regarding Hewitt's second claim, that h i s Sixth and

Fourteenth Amendment r i g h t s t o counsel were v i o l a t e d when the
Board did not allow him t o have an attorney present at h i s parole
hearing, a prisoner does have the r i g h t to l e g a l counsel at an
i n i t i a l hearing. The Supreme Court has stated that "appointment
of counsel . . . i s required at every stage of a criminal
proceeding where substantial r i g h t s of a criminal accused may be

In

B e a u l i e u . t h e Court held t h a t t h i s r i g h t was p r o t e c t e d by t h e Federal
Sentencing G u i d e l i n e ' s requirement t h a t a f e d e r a l p r i s o n e r "be g i v e n adequate
n o t i c e of and an o p p o r t u n i t y t o rebut or e x p l a i n information t h a t i s used a g a i n s t
him." 893 F.2d a t 1181.
10

See a l s o Lynch v . United S t a t e s Parole Commission 768 F.2d 4 9 1 , 498
(2d. Cir. 1985). A p a r o l e e has a due process r i g h t t o view a p r e s e n t e n c e r e p o r t
prior to a parole revocation hearing.
Howeverf t h i s r i g h t i s l i m i t e d and i f
d i s c l o s u r e would " s e r i o u s l y d i s r u p t t h e p r i s o n e r ' s i n s t i t u t i o n a l program; r e v e a l
c o n f i d e n t i a l s o u r c e s of information; or r e s u l t i n harm t o any person . . . " then
reasonable a c c e s s means a summary of t h e unprotected m a t e r i a l . "
7

affected."

Mempa v. Walklina, 389 U.S. 128, 134 (1969). u

In

another case, Gardner v. Florida, the Supreme Court stated:
[I]t is now clear that the sentencing
process, as well as the trial itself, must
satisfy the requirements of the Due Process
Clause. . . . [T]he sentencing is a critical
stage of the criminal proceeding at which
[the prisoner] is entitled to the effective
assistance of counsel.
Gardner, 430 U.S. 349, 358 (1977), citing Mempa, 389 U.S. at
134.

n

Manifestly, the Sixth Amendment right to counsel exists
during the sentencing stage of criminal proceedings, and the
Fourteenth Amendment guarantees this right to defendants in state
trials.
C,

Gideon v. Wainwriaht, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
Rights to be Free of Cruel and Unusual Punishment Under
the Eighth Amendment
Defendant Hewitt claims that his hearing did not comply

with state guidelines and thus violated his due process rights
and submitted him to cruel and unusual punishment.
will be addressed as two issues.

These claims

First, that the Board of

Pardons considered factors in making it's determination which
were improper under Utah's Sentencing Guidelines, and second,
that the guideline recommendations were exceeded.

See also Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 629-35 (1986) and Moran
v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 428-32 (1986).
12

Gardner was a capital punishment case, but the court's statement
about a prisoner's right to counsel at sentencing does not appear to be
restricted to capital punishment cases.

8

1.

Consideration of Improper Factors
The Court assumes without deciding that Hewitt's

allegations are true and that the Board of Pardons considered
factors not specifically set out in Utah's Sentencing Guidelines•
The Court finds that there is no federally protected
constitutional right to limit the Board of Pardon's
considerations.
In the federal system, federal statutes allow a
sentencing judge to consider any reliable information13 in making
a determination of a federal prisoner's sentence.
3661.

18 U.S.C.A. §

These statutes do not violate an individual's

constitutional rights.

Similarly, this Court holds that the Utah

Board of Pardon's consideration of reliable information is
allowable under the federal constitution.
This Court agrees with the Magistrate's conclusion that
Utah's Sentence and Release Guidelines do not bind the Board or
create a liberty interest.

This court adopts the Magistrate

Judge's ruling in this regard:

"The guidelines of the Utah Board

of Pardons are permissive and non-binding. . . * The Board of
Pardons may exceed their guidelines as they determine proper and
no violation of federal law results."
Recommendation p. 4.

Magistrate's Report and

Further, the applicable Utah Statutes do

13

United States v. Bavlin, 535 F.Supp. 1145, remanded on other grounds
696 F.2d 1030 (information a court considers must be reliable under $ 3661).

9

not create a federally protected liberty interest in restricting
the information which the Board of Pardons considers.

See U.C.A.

1953 § 77-18-1 (5)(b); U.C.A. 1953 § 77-18-5; U.C.A. 1953 § 7727-13 (2) and (5); Utah Rules Crim.Proc, Rule 22(a).
2*

Exceeding Sentencing Guidelines

The Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge that there
is no federal constitutional right to object to a sentence above
the state guidelines so long as the statutory maximum is not
exceeded.14
II •

IMMUNITY OF PAROLE OFFICERS
The Court next looks at whether members of the Utah

Board of Pardon have immunity as a matter of federal law.
The Magistrate Judge properly determined that the
Eleventh Amendment bars H e w i t t s suit against the parole officers
in their official capacity.
Relying upon Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police,
491 U.S. 58 (1989), the Magistrate Judge determined that state
officials also have absolute immunity as individuals.

However,

in Hafer v. Melo, 112 S.Ct. 358 (1991) the Supreme Court held
that "state officials, sued in their individual capacities, are
persons within the meaning of § 1983.

The Eleventh Amendment

does not bar such suits, nor are state officers absolutely immune

14

United States v. Jimenez. 928 F.2d 356, 364 (10th Cir. 1991) ("A
sentence imposed within the prescribed statutory limits generally will not be
found to be cruel and unusual.")

10

from personal liability under § 1983 solely by virtue of the
official nature of their acts."

Id,, at 365.

Under this ruling,

the individual Board of Pardon members are not protected by
absolute sovereign immunity.

However, they may be qualifiedly

immune from Plaintiff's claims.15
Based on the foregoing, the Magistrate's Report and
Recommendation is approved in part, and remanded in part.
Consequently, it is hereby
ORDERED, that this case is referred back to the
Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) for entry
of an order of service of process of plaintiff's complaint and
this order, instructing Defendants to respond to Plaintiff's
allegations pertaining to the following claimed violations of his
rights in connection with the initial parole release hearing,
(1)

the limited right to present witnesses;

(2)

the limited right of reasonable access to

(3)

the right to counsel.

documents;

In addition, defendants may submit to the court
documentation and information as to whether qualified immunity
bars l i a b i l i t y of defendants in t h e i r individual c a p a c i t i e s .

Q u a l i f i e d immunity p r o t e c t s government o f f i c i a l s from l i a b i l i t y f o r
damages - i n s o f a r as t h e i r conduct does not v i o l a t e c l e a r l y e s t a b l i s h e d s t a t u t o r y
or c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t s of which a reasonable person would have known.** Harlow
v , F i t z g e r a l d , 457 U.S. 800, 818 ( 1 9 8 2 ) ; Griess v . S t a t e of Colorado, 841 F.2d
1042, 1047 (10th C i r . 1 9 8 8 ) .
11

DATED:

September _^_T_, 1992.

J./THOMAS GREENE
IITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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